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Abstract
Experience from the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany suggests that there may 
be a looming problem concerning uninsured individuals and defaulters that could 
derail coverage projection numbers in the United States under the Affordable Care 
Act. In those countries, the young, people with migrant backgrounds, and those with 
lower incomes—precisely the groups the Affordable Care Act is seeking to cover—
are overrepresented in the numbers of the uninsured and defaulters, frequently 
because of difficulty in paying for their premiums. In these three countries, penalties 
or suspension of coverage alone has not led everyone to purchase coverage or 
prevented some from defaulting. Help in addressing the vulnerable position of the 
uninsured may be needed. Examples include using a multifaceted approach in which 
public authorities help with debt restructuring, freeing some funds in the exchanges 
to help vulnerable groups, and compensating insurers for their outstanding payments 
if they follow an agreed protocol instead of canceling coverage.
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Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) aims to increase insurance coverage while improving 
quality and containing costs in the United States. This goal is being pursued in large 
measure through the development of health insurance exchanges, which started oper-
ating in October 2013. Despite the rocky start due to severe problems with the enroll-
ment websites in the federal exchange and in some state exchanges, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) enrollment projection of 7 million during 2014 was met. Yet the 
debate about the law’s success in covering more people continues.
The CBO (2014) predicts that exchange enrollment will triple, to 24 million, by 
2016. Whether it does will depend on many factors. A first set relates to the attrac-
tiveness of the insurance policies, including premium levels, cost sharing, breadth of 
provider network, and available tax subsidies. This will be directly affected by the 
Supreme Court’s upcoming decision on the Constitutionality of the premium subsi-
dies in states that use the federal exchange. A second set of factors concerns how 
enrollment is facilitated and which technical solutions are chosen, including web-
sites, navigators, and telephone lines. How choice and available subsidies are pre-
sented is a key issue. A final set of factors focuses on how enrollment is enforced. 
This includes not only enforcement of the individual mandate to purchase insurance, 
but also how to deal with those who default on their premium. As will be shown, the 
enforcement levers in the United States are considerably weaker than in the other 
countries.
This article will focus on this final set of factors and review relevant experience 
with enforcing enrollment in the Dutch, German, and Swiss private insurance markets. 
In all three countries, mandating that people purchase private insurance, rather than 
providing coverage through an automatic mechanism, has led to increased numbers of 
the uninsured, although these effects have sometimes been temporary. A related issue 
currently receiving much attention is not whether people enroll in exchange policies, 
per se, but whether those who enroll actually pay their premiums. At the end of April 
2014, when the first annual open enrollment period had ended, Republicans in the 
House of Representatives claimed that only two thirds of enrollees had paid premiums 
for their first month of coverage. Supporters of the legislation strongly disagreed, 
pointing out that the two thirds figure included many people whose premium pay-
ments were not yet due. Reports from Wellpoint, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Association, and America’s Health Insurance Plans (a trade association of commercial 
insurers) indicate that 80% to 90% of prospective enrollees had paid their premiums, 
while California had reported payment levels of 85% in mid-April (Jost, 2014). The 
issue is a critical one, because if a large percentage of those signing up on the exchanges 
ultimately do not pay their premiums, the overall effectiveness of the reform could be 
threatened—particularly if those who are delinquent are younger and healthier than 
the average person obtaining coverage through the exchange. A crucial question is 
how an exchange can enforce enrollment and prevent rising numbers of defaulters on 
private insurance policies in a market that is private in nature. Will private insurers 
simply cancel the policies of defaulters?
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This article reviews the Dutch, German, and Swiss solutions to some of these prob-
lems. First, we examine how those countries responded to increasing numbers of the 
uninsured because of nonenrollment. Second, we review public policies for those who 
default on their premiums. Third, we discuss the available evidence on the back-
grounds of uninsured individuals and defaulters. We finish with important lessons for 
government and insurers.
New Contribution
Up till now, health insurance coverage was voluntary in the United States. The ACA 
changed this in 2014, with the first penalties due with income taxes on April 15, 2015. 
The size of the penalty is small initially, but rises substantially over a 2-year period. 
Because the United States has no experience with such a system, it is important to 
examine countries that have such experience. The Netherlands and Switzerland fully 
rely on private insurance to cover their populations, while around 11% of the German 
population relies on private insurance. This article is the first to systematically exam-
ine the experience of these countries as they have tried to enforce their health insur-
ance mandates. We focus on how their mandates are enforced as well as how each of 
the countries deal with defaulters.
Overview of the Three Countries
Since comprehensive health reform was enacted in Switzerland (1996) and the 
Netherlands (2006), it is mandated that all residents purchase their own (private) 
health insurance plan and be responsible for paying their monthly premium—similar 
to arrangements under the American exchanges (van Ginneken, Swartz, & Van der 
Wees, 2013). Having community-rated premiums in place also necessitated a system 
of tax subsidies to offset the regressive effect of premiums and to make the premiums 
affordable. These systems are quite generous when compared with those in the U.S. 
exchanges, where about 8 million people received subsides on the exchange. (Far 
more, of course, receive subsidies through their employers or Medicaid.) In 2014, in 
the Netherlands, 57% of all households received a tax subsidy (zorgtoeslag) in 2013 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2014b), which corresponds to about 32% of all residents, 
while in Switzerland 29% of all insured individuals received a tax subsidy 
(Prämienverbilligung) in 2012 (Bundesamtes für Gesundheit [BAG: The Federal 
Office of Public Health] 2014). In the Netherlands, income should not exceed $35,580 
(€30,939) per year for singles or $48,804 (€42,438) per year for households to be eli-
gible for tax subsidies, while in Switzerland the amounts and their calculation varies 
by canton. Generally speaking, in both countries those receiving tax subsidies are the 
lower incomes, youth, and the elderly.
Prior to the reform, contributions were mostly automatically deducted as a per-
centage from earnings, that is, predominantly as an earmarked payroll tax in the 
Netherlands, whereas the Swiss system was voluntary (but also provided near-
universal coverage). In 2009, Germany introduced a mandate for all residents, 
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including those qualifying for the substitutive private insurance scheme, who pre-
viously could opt out of insurance. The substitutive private insurance scheme 
(Private Krankenversicherung or PKV) covers 9.0 million people (11% of the 
population) for primary coverage and consists of people above an income thresh-
old (roughly $5,000, or €4,350, per month in 2014), certain categories of the self-
employed, and public employees (Busse & Blumel, 2014). As the system 
predominantly covers the well-off and the market is not regulated to the same 
extent as the Dutch or Swiss health insurance market, tax subsidies are not avail-
able. Collectively, these reforms led to temporary increases in the numbers of the 
uninsured (Netherlands, Switzerland) and also rising numbers of people defaulting 
on their premiums (Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany).
Another important issue involves undocumented migrants (UDMs), who are 
explicitly excluded from coverage in the U.S. exchange (van Ginneken & Gray, 
2013). In the Netherlands, UDMs cannot purchase coverage, but a separate regula-
tion exists stipulating that health care providers can reclaim the costs of treating 
UDMs for all types of care if they cannot reclaim them from the UDMs them-
selves. In Switzerland, however, UDMs must purchase cover in the system. In 
Germany, in practice, UDMs receive only emergency care (Gray & van Ginneken, 
2012).
The next sections describe policies to enforce the mandate and policies to deal with 
defaulters. Table 1 provides an overview.
Policies to Enforce the Mandate
In the Netherlands, the number of the uninsured has recently been on the decline after 
years of gradual growth. Although there has been some methodology-based debate 
about the actual numbers, the latest figures show that the uninsured (i.e., those not 
registered with a health plan) declined from 290,000 in 2010 (1.8% of the population) 
to 28,740 in 2012 (0.2%; RIVM, 2014). As part of its efforts to reduce the number of 
the uninsured, since 2011, the government has actively been tracking them down, 
which required setting up a new database that links various registries. The system 
involves several government bodies, uses a strict and detailed protocol with warnings, 
fines, and may end in forced enrollment and garnishing of wages (see Box 1 for more 
details). The only exemption made to the mandate is granted to what the Dutch call 
“conscientious objectors” (gewetensbezwaarden). These are persons who refuse to 
insure themselves on grounds of religious or other beliefs. Although they do not have 
to purchase health insurance, they have to pay a general income tax equal to the 
(income related) employer contribution. These contributions are then saved in per-
sonal accounts (i.e., there is no pooling), which are managed by the National Health 
Care Institute (NHCI).1 Any incurred health expenditures will be reimbursed from 
these individuals’ personal account. If this does not suffice, the rest will be due out-of-
pocket. Exemptions should be requested at the Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB; 
Schäfer et al., 2010).
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Table 1. Policies to Enforce the Mandate and Policies to Deal With Defaulters in the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany.
Netherlands Switzerland Germany
Effective for 
achieving coverage 
or prevention of 
nonpaying?
Policies to 
enforce the 
mandate
Fines for 
nonenrollment
   Mixed, also deters 
people from 
enrolling
Forced 
enrollment
   Yes, but does not 
solve vulnerable 
position of insured
Policies to 
deal with 
defaulters
Suspending/
canceling 
coverage
No longer 
allowed
No longer 
allowed
 No, also affects 
many vulnerable 
groups
Benefit 
reduction
   No, leads to less 
equality
Garnishing 
wages
   Yes, but legally 
difficult
Body assuming 
responsibility 
for defaulters
   Yes, but requires 
policy capacity and 
funding
Compensating 
insurers
   Yes, but may be 
costly
Source. Authors’ own compilation.
Every month, the National Health Care Institute, or Zorginstituut, receives a report 
from the Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB), a body responsible for registering 
national insurance schemes. If the NHCI finds that an individual has not purchased 
coverage, it will send a letter requesting that he or she do so. Failure to purchase 
insurance within 3 months then results in a fine of $371 (€332.25). It will be fol-
lowed by another $382(€332.25) fine after another 3 months if coverage is not 
purchased. After a further 6 weeks of nonpayment, a reminder is sent. If this 
reminder is not followed by payment within 2 weeks, a bailiff from the Centraal 
Justitieel Incassobureau (CJIB), a government agency tasked with collecting dif-
ferent kinds of fines, will be alerted and will collect the fines. Bailiffs’ costs are at 
least $46 (€40) and are payable by the uninsured.
There are special regulations for those with large debts, who have the option to 
pay in installments. If a person still does not select an insurer, the NHCI purchases a 
plan on behalf of the uninsured, and the premium is automatically deducted from the 
insured’s income for the next 12 months. Those who are self-employed or without 
Box 1. The Dutch protocol for enforcing the mandate.
(continued)
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income have to pay via an invoice issued by the CJIB. The NHCI purchases plans 
from all available insurers according to their market share. This monthly “standard” 
premium (€110.75, or $127) is higher than those purchased personally (average pre-
miums are €100, or about $115, but cheaper policies are available). Lastly, if the 
individual has not yet paid the fines, those are still due as well. After 12 months, the 
insured receives a letter stating that premiums will no longer be automatically 
deducted (or invoiced by the CJIB), and the insurer lowers the administrative pre-
mium to its current community-rated premium. Starting at the beginning of a new 
year, the insured can switch insurer again. The NHCI also informs the employer that 
it is required by law to deduct the uninsured employee’s premium and pay it directly 
to the NHCI. If the employer fails to take it out of the employee’s paycheck, it is still 
required to pay the premium for the employee.
In Switzerland, the mandate enforcement is the responsibility of the 26 cantons, 
which are required to establish a mechanism for those who do not voluntarily obtain 
coverage within 3 months of being born in, or moving to, Switzerland. These mecha-
nisms show some variation, but generally operate as follows: Cantonal authorities, for 
example, municipalities, compare the data of health insurers with regional population 
registries, and if there are discrepancies they notify those without insurance to pur-
chase a health plan or face a fine (Okma & Crivelli, 2013). Cantons may impose penal-
ties of 30% to 50% above the premium on those who remain uninsured. Misrepresenting 
health insurance coverage is punishable by fines and prison terms (Glied, Hartz, & 
Giorgi, 2007). If individuals fail to purchase insurance within 3 months, the responsi-
ble authorities choose a health plan from the plans available in the canton. As a result, 
the newly enrolled individual can no longer make an individual choice. The rising 
numbers of the uninsured were mostly the result of cancellation of policies of people 
who were defaulting on their premiums.
Uninsurance in Germany, which, according to official statistics, represented 
137,000 people (0.17% of the population) in 2011, is not as big an issue as it has been 
in the Netherlands and Switzerland. However, there is some debate about the accuracy 
of the number, as these are self-reported microcensus data and can be assumed to be 
underreported (Busse & Blumel, 2014). Data on uninsurance for the private substitu-
tive insurance market are not gathered, perhaps because many of the individuals in 
question are eligible for the statutory system, too. The perceived low numbers of the 
uninsured perhaps explain why there is no explicit policy to track down this group, but 
some substantial fines for uninsurance do apply. As of January 2014, the uninsured 
may be faced with retroactive claims for the time they have spent without insurance 
since January 2009, when the insurance mandate was extended to all people. Fines are 
based on the length of time without insurance and may reach nearly $10,100.
In August 2013, to encourage people to enroll, and realizing that the high fines 
could deter people from doing so, the government canceled debt for those who would 
Box 1. (continued)
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enroll before the end of 2013, either by joining the statutory system or, if eligible, by 
purchasing substitutive private insurance. The regulation did not deliver the expected 
results. Reportedly, only 10,000 people enrolled, with critics lamenting that the regula-
tion was not publicized enough (1A Verbraucherportal, 2014).
Policies to Deal With Defaulters
In the Netherlands, the number of defaulters—people who have not paid premiums in 
6 months—rose to 316,378 in 2012 (2.0% of the population), an increase of 50,000 
over the number in 2010 (RIVM, 2014). The government has tried to resolve the situ-
ation by no longer allowing insurers to suspend defaulters, and at the same time auto-
matically deducting premiums from those people’s salaries. The current regulation, 
which was agreed between the Ministry of Health and the umbrella organization of 
health insurers (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland or ZN), stipulates that if a person has not 
paid premiums for 6 months, he or she will be reported by the insurer to the NHCI and 
registered as a defaulter. After this, another strict protocol is followed in some ways 
similar to that for the uninsured, in which the NHCI takes over financial responsibility 
for the defaulter who nevertheless stays insured with his or her insurer while his or her 
wages are garnished (see Box 2 for the detailed protocol). An evaluation of this policy 
showed that, although it was successful in terms of keeping people covered and 
reclaiming outstanding debt, the numbers of people falling into this category by 
defaulting on their premiums is still increasing. This trend indicates that the regulation 
does not address the underlying issues that cause people to default, which mostly 
relate to the high debt and financial problems these individuals already have. The 
Ministry of Health has acknowledged that this is a complex problem. It has therefore 
been piloting projects with a multifaceted approach involving insurers, municipalities, 
and debt-restructuring organizations, focusing more on the root of the problem and its 
prevention (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sports, 2013).
Box 2. The Dutch protocol for defaulters.
After not paying premiums for 6 months, the NHCI registers an individual as a 
defaulter. From this moment, the defaulter will have to pay the higher administra-
tive premium of €144 ([about $166] or 130% of the standard premium) directly to 
the NHCI, but will remain insured with his or her insurer. Any outstanding debt will 
still have to be settled with the insurer directly. Employers or social security agen-
cies are notified and have to deduct the premium from monthly income and transfer 
it to the NHCI. Those without income receive monthly invoices from the CJIB. If 
a person paying through invoices is eligible for tax subsidies (which in the 
Netherlands normally are paid out to individuals directly), the CJIB withholds the 
tax subsidy from the tax agency, uses it to pay the insurer, and notifies the defaulter 
that it has done so. The insured needs to pay only the difference per invoice. After 
(continued)
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6 weeks of nonpayment, a reminder is sent out. If it remains unanswered within 2 
weeks, a bailiff from the CJIB will collect the premium. During the procedure, the 
defaulter cannot switch to another insurer.
Only the insurer can free a defaulter from defaulter status and will do so only if 
the insured has cleared all remaining debt, has agreed on a debt-restructuring plan, 
or has entered a government program for debt clearance. If outstanding debt 
remains, the insurer can receive some compensation from the national health insur-
ance fund (which pools all employer contributions for health insurance before risk-
adjusted allocation to insurers) on the condition that the above protocol has been 
followed. If the employer fails to deduct the premium from the employee’s salary, 
it is nevertheless obliged to pay the administrative premium for the employee.
In Switzerland, the problem of uninsurance was mostly the temporary result of a 
reform of the Federal Health Insurance Act in 2006, which allowed insurers to sus-
pend coverage for defaulters, a rising issue at the time. Contrary to expectations, the 
reform did not lead to lower numbers of defaulters, but instead to higher numbers of 
the uninsured among people who could not afford their premiums. Indeed, the num-
bers of the uninsured as a result of defaulting continued to grow, by as much as 4.3% 
of the population in some cantons (Crivelli, 2010). More than 366,000 people 
(almost 5% of the country’s population) were sued by insurers for unpaid premiums 
in 2009, and insurance reimbursements were withheld for 93,000 of them (Office 
Fédéral de la Santé Publique, 2011). After it became clear that allowing insurers to 
suspend coverage led to rising numbers of uninsured individuals, the parliament 
revised the law in 2010.
Similar to those in the Netherlands, Swiss authorities now mediate between the 
defaulter and the insurer. As of January 2012, a new regulation stipulates that, if insur-
ers fail to reclaim outstanding premiums and debt, cantons have to pay 85% of unpaid 
premiums and other debts to health insurers on behalf of people experiencing serious 
financial problems. In addition, although wages are not garnished, tax subsidies, which 
normally are paid out to eligible individuals by the cantonal authorities, are directly 
transferred to the insurers. The defaulters must pay insurers as soon as they can, but 
their coverage will no longer be suspended or limited (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011). However, this regulation has imposed 
a financial burden on the cantons, and some of them (e.g., Luzern, Solothurn, & 
Thurgau) have reacted by establishing “black lists,” with those on the lists eligible 
only for emergency care. This was also allowed under the new regulation and should 
give cantons the means to motivate people to pay their debts. The unpublished lists 
comprise those who have failed to pay their premiums but usually exclude some vul-
nerable groups (children, social security recipients). The lists are politically controver-
sial and have been criticized as ineffective because they may pose a larger administrative 
burden and do not change the payment obligation of the canton (Aschwanden & 
Gerny, 2013).
Box 2. (continued)
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Although the German PKV has historically been an insurance scheme for the well-
to-do, many policyholders are experiencing increasing difficulty in paying their pre-
miums for various reasons. The cost of the premiums has reportedly increased on 
average twice as fast as in the statutory system, and they are not community rated—
that is, they may vary according to risk and could therefore become unaffordable for 
some more vulnerable groups. The federal government has sought to counter this 
development by installing a so-called basic premium (Basistarif; €600 per month or 
about $690), which is based on the maximum contribution and benefit package in the 
statutory system. However, switching to this policy is not permissible until the age of 
55 years, and therefore many lower income self-employed individuals may be stuck 
with an expensive risk-rated premium. The result has been that, at the end of 2011, 
almost 2% of the approximately 9 million privately insured had outstanding insurance-
related debt, which together amounted to more than $575 million (€500 million). 
Those who do pay their premiums therefore indirectly pay for these defaulters, as their 
policies cannot be canceled and they still are eligible for emergency care (Gesellensetter, 
2013).
The substitutive private insurance companies have adopted a five-step policy to 
grapple with defaulting. First, if an insurer finds that a policyholder has not paid a 
premium for 2 months, a reminder is sent that if the debt is not settled within 2 weeks, 
coverage will be limited to emergency care. Second, if the outstanding premium has 
not been paid after those 2 weeks, the insurer sends a notice to the policyholder with a 
3-day deadline to pay; otherwise, a late fee will apply. Third, although the policy-
holder can receive only emergency care (a benefit reduction), they owe the full amount 
in premiums for every month that has not been paid. Debt will add up because of inter-
est of 1% per month on all outstanding payments. Fourth, if the policyholder still has 
outstanding premiums, late fees, and interest 1 year after benefit reduction, he or she 
will automatically have to pay the basic premium. This premium may be higher than 
what was charged before. The policyholder continues to receive only emergency care. 
Finally, the reduction of benefits will end only if the insured pays off all debt. The 
PKV’s insurers cannot garnish wages as it remains a private insurance market.
Clearly, the policy so far is not working well. Reportedly, the federal government, 
together with industry, has been working on a special “defaulter premium.” This is a 
much lower premium (there is talk of about €100 per month, or about $115) for which 
the insurer only reimburses emergency care. This would prevent defaulters from rap-
idly accumulating debt, but the proposal is very controversial politically as it implies 
less equality in the health system, with the emergence of a vulnerable underclass cov-
ered only for the bare minimum.
Who Are the Uninsured and Defaulters?
The organization Statistics Netherlands actively monitors the numbers and character-
istics of the uninsured and defaulters. Of the relatively small group of uninsured in 
2012, 63% were men, while those below the age of 35 years, those with migrant back-
grounds (at least one parent born abroad), and those living in urban areas were 
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overrepresented (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sports, 2013). The Ministry of Health 
has therefore focused its information campaigns on these groups.
Among the larger group of defaulters in the Netherlands, young people, migrants, 
and those with lower incomes were overrepresented. In 2011, 44% of defaulters were 
younger than 35 years, compared with 24% who were between 35 and 44 years, 20% 
who were from 45 to 54 years, and 12% who were older 55 years. In the same year, 
45% had a migrant background, (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sports, 2012), 
although individuals with migrant backgrounds make up only about 20% of the total 
population (Statistics Netherlands, 2014a). Fifty-seven percent earn less than €2,300 
per month ($2,645), and 60% are eligible for tax subsidies, that is, most belong to 
lower income groups. Furthermore, about 24% (mainly the unemployed and those 
with disabilities) receive social security.
While precise information on the characteristics of the uninsured and defaulters on 
a national level is absent because of the fragmented (by canton and insurer) data col-
lection systems in Switzerland, it seems likely that the uninsured and defaulters are 
coming from similar segments of the population as they do in the Netherlands. Recent 
cross-sectional analysis of about half a million Swiss insured largely confirms this 
(von Wyl & Beck, 2015). In Germany, anecdotal evidence and media reporting sug-
gest that, in the PKV, the defaulters consist mostly of poorer-retired people and lower 
income self-employed. Although the elderly are eligible for the cheaper basic pre-
mium (set at the maximum contribution in statutory insurance), it may nevertheless 
pose a difficult financial burden. Furthermore, in Switzerland, UDM are obliged, 
within 3 months of arriving in the country, to purchase coverage like everyone else. In 
practice, the high premiums and cost-sharing requirements, as well as complex admin-
istrative procedures and fear of the authorities, may seriously hamper their ability to 
purchase insurance. Therefore, this group will often rely on the emergency care pro-
vided by cantons (as required by law), so it can safely be assumed that there are many 
UDM among the uninsured (van Ginneken & Gray, 2015).
Policy Implications for U.S. Exchanges
The first lesson coming out of the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany is that there 
may be a looming problem with the uninsured and defaulters that could derail projec-
tions of coverage numbers under the ACA. People overrepresented in the numbers of 
the uninsured and defaulters in the Netherlands (and likely in Switzerland) are the 
young, people with migrant backgrounds, and those with lower incomes. These are 
precisely the groups with high uninsurance rates in the United States, for which the 
ACA is seeking to increase coverage (Rice et al., 2013). This will be a major chal-
lenge. Already, we know that enrollment of young persons on the exchanges is lower 
than originally projected; that Latinos are less likely to enroll than other racial and 
ethnic groups; and that poor and near-poor persons remain vulnerable because half of 
the states did not choose to expand Medicaid coverage (Levitt, Claxton, & Damico, 
2013; Lovett, 2014). As these groups tend to have lower incomes than others—and 
because, particularly among young people, many do not believe they need 
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coverage—the defaulter problem in the United States could become much larger than 
in the European exchanges. Therefore, exchanges should set up a database and install 
effective policies for monitoring the uninsured and defaulters.
Second, penalties alone have not led everyone to purchase insurance, and even 
perhaps have deterred people from purchasing it and from making themselves known 
to authorities, as seen in Germany. In European countries, individuals must both pay 
penalties and still enroll in insurance, and if necessary, it is purchased on behalf of 
them. These mechanisms are not available in the United States, where the government 
cannot file criminal charges against someone who refuses to pay the penalty, and the 
wages cannot be withheld (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 2010). Under 
the ACA, it is legal to stay uninsured as long as one pays a penalty. Penalties are rela-
tively low for 2014 and 2015, but by 2016 they will rise to about $700 per person 
($2,100 per family) or 2.5% of income, whichever is higher. Many exemptions exist, 
however. According to CBO, at least 23 of the 30 million that are expected to be unin-
sured in 2016 could qualify for an exemption (CBO, 2014). These include not only 
undocumented individuals, but those who experience financial hardship (e.g., have 
filed for bankruptcy or incurred major financial debt due to medical expenses recently, 
have incomes so low that they do not have to file tax returns, or have low incomes and 
live in states that did not expand Medicaid.) This, in turn, raises serious concerns 
regarding the long-term effectiveness of the exchanges in meeting the projected enroll-
ment projections.
Third, exchanges should put special emphasis on monitoring the continued afford-
ability of premiums given the size of available tax subsidies. As seen in the European 
exchanges, rising premium levels played a catalyzing role in the increasing numbers 
of uninsured and defaulters. However, there is no program (beyond the subsidies avail-
able to everyone below 400% of the poverty level) to subsidize those who have trouble 
paying their premiums. Nor is such a program possible without further Congressional 
action. It is possible that future data on affordability could influence the development 
of such legislation.
Moreover, a defaulter problem will certainly have an effect on premium levels in 
the exchanges, as insurance companies will try to recover those losses from others 
enrolled. But more could be done to freeing some funds in the exchanges to help vul-
nerable groups.
The fourth lesson is simply suspending and canceling coverage, expecting that 
individuals will then pay off remaining debt, will not work. It has led to some dramatic 
results in Switzerland and Germany, putting people in deeper financial trouble and 
resulting in increases in the underinsured and uninsured. In spite of this, the suspen-
sion and cancellation of coverage due to default is included in a new provision from 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Center for Consumer Information and 
Insurance Oversight, 2014). An alternative way to get people to pay premiums is to 
garnish wages and even have bailiffs sent to collect unpaid premiums. It seems unlikely 
that such mechanisms will become available in the United States.
Finally, making a third party—for example, a new federal, new state agencies, or 
the exchange itself—financially responsible for the defaulters and involving 
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relevant stakeholders could take the burden away from the insurers and assist 
defaulters with clearing their debt. Helping defaulters with debt restructuring, or 
compensating insurers for their outstanding payments if they follow an agreed pro-
tocol instead of immediately canceling coverage, as seen in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, are solutions that U.S. exchanges could explore without having to rely 
on penalties or regulations.
Without appropriate and timely action, the coverage numbers of the ACA could fall 
behind expectations and many already vulnerable people could be further put into 
financial trouble due to defaulting and accumulating debt. We should not wait, as the 
Dutch, Swiss, and Germans did, until the numbers of uninsured and defaulters are 
rising.
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